USS Fitzgerald struck by Phillipine freighter

[Ben]

Putting the blame in a more-them less-us direction.

Sorry, just reading the post makes it hard for me to get your intent. Are you agreeing that it is more likely the cargo vessel's fault than the Navy vessel's fault, or saying I shouldn't be looking to blame the cargo vessel? Not calling you out, I just am unsure. :)

[just Warren]

I want as much blame on them, the operators of the cargo ship, as possible.


Thankfully no one on the bigger ship was hurt or there'd be no end to the complaining from their side.

[Ben]

I want as much blame on them, the operators of the cargo ship, as possible.

Okay, gotchya. :)

[KD5NRH]

I want as much blame on them, the operators of the cargo ship, as possible.

Going to be difficult; Crystal had right of way, and Fitzgerald was vastly faster and more nimble, with more detection capability.

Think of it like cruising through a treeless part of Kansas in your Ferrari at 25mph, and being T-boned by a freight train going 15mph, then trying to blame the train for not stopping or turning in time.

Basically, Fitzgerald was not only burdened, but also had the opportunity to avoid the collision after Crystal no longer did.

[Ben]

Going to be difficult; Crystal had right of way, and Fitzgerald was vastly faster and more nimble, with more detection capability.

Think of it like cruising through a treeless part of Kansas in your Ferrari at 25mph, and being T-boned by a freight train going 15mph, then trying to blame the train for not stopping or turning in time.

Basically, Fitzgerald was not only burdened, but also had the opportunity to avoid the collision after Crystal no longer did.

From my armchair, I would wager that even if 90% of the accident was the Crystal's fault, the Navy will still get >50% of the blame. The media seems to be focusing 90% on the Navy.

In the end, all we can do is wait for the results of the USCG and Navy investigations.

[Hawkmoon]

In the end, all we can do is wait for the results of the USCG and Navy investigations.

And the Japanese Coast Guard -- which ultimately has jurisdiction, since the incident was in Japanese territorial waters (I think).

[Blakenzy]

Going to be difficult; Crystal had right of way, and Fitzgerald was vastly faster and more nimble, with more detection capability.

Think of it like cruising through a treeless part of Kansas in your Ferrari at 25mph, and being T-boned by a freight train going 15mph, then trying to blame the train for not stopping or turning in time.

Basically, Fitzgerald was not only burdened, but also had the opportunity to avoid the collision after Crystal no longer did.

Yep, and make that a super duper equipped combat seek-and-destroy James Bond Ferrari (or Aston Martin  ).

Epic fail.

Now I wonder what a fleet of hostile Russian attack subs would do if the Fitzgerald is representative of the US Navy's readiness...

[Scout26]

Yep, I'm going to have to agree with KD and Blakenzy.   

Water going Rules of the Road, plus the Crystal pretty much traveling in a straight line (Cargo ships very much operate on the "Shortest Distance" principle, as fuel and time = $$$$.)  through in that Fitzgerald is much more nimble and is supposed to see everything out there, and it's hard to fault the cargo ship. 

Which is also why I  when the tinfoil brigade uses the track previously posted to "show" that the Crystal circled about trying to intentionally ram the Fitzgerald, that would be like Kim Jung-Un trying to play tag with Usain Bolt.

[Hawkmoon]

http://news.trust.org/item/20170626101937-6xsul

So much for the freighter having been on autopilot and nobody knew how to turn the ship. The skipper of the freighter says the destroyer turned in front of his ship, they signaled with a flashing light (which was ignored), and they tried to make a right turn to avoid the collision.

IF that can be verified, it sounds more like my original theory that the destroyer misjudged, and thought they could pass in front of the freighter.

[just Warren]

Well, we'll see if that stands up.

However aren't there proximity alarms on most vessels? Certainly military ships would have such.

One thing that I was thinking about is the artistic technique of foreshortening that makes something look closer (in 2D) than it actually would be, and the reverse of that that would make something small and near look large and far.

If you've ever been to Disneyland, on main street the upper story windows are actually really small they're just presented in a way that makes the buildings look like full size multi-story buildings.

So what if some combination of ambient light, direct and reflected off the ocean surface, and the placement of the cargo ship's running lights relative to the angle the crew of the warship was  seeing them, and the void of ambient light where the bigger ship was blocking it gave the illusion that the bigger ship was farther away, like twice as far as the crew of the Fitz thought?

That would explain why they though they could make it. Also why that warning light didn't have any effect because it too was part of this illusion that the Fitz's crew was seeing.

[freakazoid]

http://news.trust.org/item/20170626101937-6xsul

So much for the freighter having been on autopilot and nobody knew how to turn the ship. The skipper of the freighter says the destroyer turned in front of his ship, they signaled with a flashing light (which was ignored), and they tried to make a right turn to avoid the collision.

IF that can be verified, it sounds more like my original theory that the destroyer misjudged, and thought they could pass in front of the freighter.

I thought they originally said that it was on autopilot with no one on the bridge?

[dm1333]

Well, we'll see if that stands up.

However aren't there proximity alarms on most vessels? Certainly military ships would have such.

One thing that I was thinking about is the artistic technique of foreshortening that makes something look closer (in 2D) than it actually would be, and the reverse of that that would make something small and near look large and far.

If you've ever been to Disneyland, on main street the upper story windows are actually really small they're just presented in a way that makes the buildings look like full size multi-story buildings.

So what if some combination of ambient light, direct and reflected off the ocean surface, and the placement of the cargo ship's running lights relative to the angle the crew of the warship was  seeing them, and the void of ambient light where the bigger ship was blocking it gave the illusion that the bigger ship was farther away, like twice as far as the crew of the Fitz thought?

That would explain why they though they could make it. Also why that warning light didn't have any effect because it too was part of this illusion that the Fitz's crew was seeing.

Radar.  Not just any radar, but a phased array radar.  Possibly even one that was designed for littoral warfare so it would have been really good at picking up crappy contacts close to shore.

[freakazoid]

The phased array radar is primarily for air search.

[dogmush]

Well, we'll see if that stands up.

However aren't there proximity alarms on most vessels? Certainly military ships would have such.

One thing that I was thinking about is the artistic technique of foreshortening that makes something look closer (in 2D) than it actually would be, and the reverse of that that would make something small and near look large and far.

If you've ever been to Disneyland, on main street the upper story windows are actually really small they're just presented in a way that makes the buildings look like full size multi-story buildings.

So what if some combination of ambient light, direct and reflected off the ocean surface, and the placement of the cargo ship's running lights relative to the angle the crew of the warship was  seeing them, and the void of ambient light where the bigger ship was blocking it gave the illusion that the bigger ship was farther away, like twice as far as the crew of the Fitz thought?

That would explain why they though they could make it. Also why that warning light didn't have any effect because it too was part of this illusion that the Fitz's crew was seeing.

Marine navigation radar will calculate closest point of approach for you, and tell you how far away something is.

[KD5NRH]

The phased array radar is primarily for air search.

Destroyers also tend to have pretty good ways of tracking stuff on the surface.  Because, you know, sometimes that stuff needs to be destroyed too.  Remember, if there's any doubt and for whatever reason neither radar is giving a useful answer, and all the binoculars are fogged, just wake up the sonar guy and have him check it out.

Fitzgerald, unless they were in the middle of some massive system reboot, had all the information, speed and maneuverability necessary to never let Crystal get within several miles of it. 

Some other comments from my expert source:

Like the Arleigh Burke-class DDGs, and Ticonderoga-class CGs and Spruance-class DDs, the Kidd-class DDGs, of which Chandler was one, have twin reversible variable-pitch screws driven by four GE LM-2500 marine gas turbines. Up to 15 knots the turbines run at constant speed and you vary the ships speed by adjusting the pitch on the screws. Above 15 knots you start increase turbine speed. (All of these ships have a top speed of around 33 knots and can accelerate from dead in the water to 25 knots in the length of the ship and come to a dead stop from 25 knots in the same distance - by reversing pitch on the screws.)

In any case, I suspect the problem wasn't that they didn't see it. More likely a) the Officer of the Deck (OOD) - I don't know how to put this - was inadequately trained, screwed up, an idiot, I dunno, and simply failed to take appropriate action, and, b) failed to call the Captain to the Bridge when things started to get dicey and he got in over his head. At night the Captain always leaves (or is supposed to leave) his "Night Orders" on the Bridge for the OOD. And they always include a note that says "Call me" if another contact is going to pass within XXX miles." (Usually five to ten, depending on his confidence in his OODs.)

Without knowing the specifics it's impossible to say at this point how they got into that situation. All I can say is what I would have done had I been the OOD on Fitzgerald. First off, as I mentioned previously, I would have had a close watch on every contact - including the Crystal - that was within visual range (roughly 8 to 10 nautical miles, or hull-down on the horizon). I would have known their course, speed, and CPA (Closest Point of Approach). Had any contact had a CPA of less than 3 miles, I probably would have taken action at that time to open that up to, say, 5 miles - long before they got that close. If traffic was so heavy that maneuvering was difficult, once another ship got to within 5 miles, I would have called the Captain to the Bridge and recommended a maneuver to get us out of the thick of things - speed up, slow down, turn, turn around, whatever was necessary. If we got to within 2 miles I would have considered the situation to be "in extremis" and sounded 5 short on the ships whistle (danger signal) to wake 'em up, turned the ship in some direction of open water, gone to flank speed (25+ knots), and left the problem in my wake.

[Ben]

Some other comments from my expert source:

And they always include a note that says "Call me" if another contact is going to pass within XXX miles." (Usually five to ten, depending on his confidence in his OODs.)

Uhm, are you sure you quoted that right? If so, the CO should have never left the bridge. I've spent lots and lots of time in the shipping lanes off CA, and while crowded, they are not nearly as crowded as where this incident occurred. In the lanes I'm familiar with, there is no way to avoid "under 5 or 10". The opposing lanes themselves are only separated by a 1nm buffer.

Edit: Or actually, it might be 2nm. I've been retired too long and can't remember for sure. Either way, under 5.
Edit again. Ha - I just looked it up and both were right. It was 2nm and they narrowed the traffic separation to 1nm just as I was separating, hence my confusion. :)

[KD5NRH]

Uhm, are you sure you quoted that right? If so, the CO should have never left the bridge. I've spent lots and lots of time in the shipping lanes off CA, and while crowded, they are not nearly as crowded as where this incident occurred. In the lanes I'm familiar with, there is no way to avoid "under 5 or 10". The opposing lanes themselves are only separated by a 1nm buffer.

Exact copy/paste.  He did mention he's been on the bridge crew of a ship (didn't specify which one) out of Yokosuka more than once, and never had an issue that far out, but that would have been in the 1970s or 1980s.  I suspect there's also a backup plan for these things (i.e. a specific OOD trusted to handle tighter conditions) so the CO doesn't have to stay awake past the point where fatigue makes him a potential liability. 
I guess the other question is whether a DDG would be actively trying to get away from at least the busiest shipping lanes, if for no other reason than to improve the signal-to-noise ratio on all those fancy ways of seeing stuff.

[RoadKingLarry]

Exact copy/paste.  He did mention he's been on the bridge crew of a ship (didn't specify which one) out of Yokosuka more than once, and never had an issue that far out, but that would have been in the 1970s or 1980s.  I suspect there's also a backup plan for these things (i.e. a specific OOD trusted to handle tighter conditions) so the CO doesn't have to stay awake past the point where fatigue makes him a potential liability. 
I guess the other question is whether a DDG would be actively trying to get away from at least the busiest shipping lanes, if for no other reason than to improve the signal-to-noise ratio on all those fancy ways of seeing stuff.

The more that comes out the more it sounds like the bridge crew on the Fitz seriously screwed the pooch.

On subs we were totally passive for signal collection when submerged. Operating in waters within 40-50 miles of a major port made detection of potential threat emitters a bit of work. The ESM system on my last boat was pretty high tech for the time (late '80s) and if set up right would prioritize contacts by threat level and signal strength. I'd typically have 100+ detected RADARs in the system but most of them were very weak and just run of the mill commercial nav RADARs. My operators and I would make our report About potential threat contacts and their signal strength and include "also hold a large number of low signal strength non-threat commercial navigation RADARs" Had one particularly obnoxious OOD (he didn't much like me) decide he wanted me to make a full report on ALL CONTACTS, DAMNIT!. At the time were operating not to far out from Norfolk, my system was reporting 150+ signals. I even tried to reason with him. ALL CONTACTS DAMNIT!!.
CONN, ESM AYE! I assigned all 150 intercepts with a contact #, keyed the mic and started reporting. Got up to about 40 reports before he sent the messenger back to the shack to shut me down.
Apparently the control room party thought it was hilarious.
 

[freakazoid]

Destroyers also tend to have pretty good ways of tracking stuff on the surface.  Because, you know, sometimes that stuff needs to be destroyed too. 

True. It's just not the phased array radar.

[KD5NRH]

True. It's just not the phased array radar.

Pretty sure even if it had trouble with low level contacts, at some point part of Crystal was at a fine angle for it...right before squashing part of it.

[freakazoid]

There are... certain limitations with it, and settings, that would keep it from being seen on purpose.

[French G.]

A lot depends on what drills or actual scenarios the ship might be dealing with. Emcon conditions, modified watches, who knows. That far out was probably not still in a restricted manuevering doctrine since while busy they were not in a channel. Most likely is that the bridge team screwed up. But we yet do not know if they had radar and disregarded it, how well their plot was maintained, etc. I am sure the inquiry will find out.

Semi not related, I need to find the quote, but I think it was Nimitz or Halsey who disagreed with the then prevalant practice of wrecking a skippers career because he wrecked his ship. In their view hazarding his vessel was exactly what a destroyer captain was supposed to do in the face of the enemy and they needed to retain and channel the rash energy of those that ran their ship aground and such. Now in today's zero defect Navy that will not be happening. And young department heads and XOs will learn further to hide their mistakes since no mistakes gets you promoted.

When Erictank and I got rear-ended by the Leyte Gulf, some of those ambiguous conditions such as are we using radar were happening. We were in an emisions control condition. Our aft lookouts were pulled because my jet shop sidekicks were running a TF-30 on the stand. The ship was doing engineering drills. The Leyte was pulling plane guard. Nobody bothered to tell them we were done flight ops.  Cue a crash stop from the engineering drills and it was suddenly hello cruiser, meet aircraft carrier.

[RoadKingLarry]

Semi not related, I need to find the quote, but I think it was Nimitz or Halsey who disagreed with the then prevalant practice of wrecking a skippers career because he wrecked his ship. In their view hazarding his vessel was exactly what a destroyer captain was supposed to do in the face of the enemy and they needed to retain and channel the rash energy of those that ran their ship aground and such. Now in today's zero defect Navy that will not be happening. And young department heads and XOs will learn further to hide their mistakes since no mistakes gets you promoted.

My opinion but there is a big difference between being bold and taking calculated risks under fire and being boneheaded in peacetime. The first should be valued the second should be flogged.

[dogmush]

FWIW, I've transited that exact area, and my night orders there are to hold a 2nm CPA on all ships, and call me if you can't find the course that will do that.  While crowded, once you clear the harbor approaches you can hold distance pretty well.

[MechAg94]

https://amgreatness.com/2017/08/20/navys-report-fitzgerald-collision-evidence-corruption/
I came across this today off a twitter link.  I figured I better put it hear instead of the thread on the second collision. 

The things that jumped out at me were the comments about the actual officer of the deck at the time not being named in the report on the incident along with comments about damage control being directed from the bridge.  I think it was implied that hatches were closed that prevented some sailors from getting out of flooded areas, but maybe I read it wrong.  I need to read through it again later.

There was also a comment about John McCain from the USS Forrestal which I had never heard before.  The author suspects the officer of the deck is being protected.